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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cutting-edge neuroscience is advancing at an incredible rate. 
Technologies like functional magnetic resonance imaging (hereinafter 
“fMRI”) are becoming more sophisticated and precise. The maturation 
of these technologies has recently provided researchers with a glimpse 
at the nearly real-time operation of the brain.1 Most importantly, new 
technologies allow for scientific studies of subjects’ brains while the 
subjects are being exposed to stimuli.2 This functional view of the brain 
permits studies that observe brain function while subjects perform other 
actions. For example, researchers can observe the brain while a subject 
is simultaneously asked questions or shown photographs or videos.3 
Certain studies using fMRI technology have been intentionally 
structured in such a way that the subject will consciously deceive the 
researcher in response to the researcher’s questioning.4 These studies 
 
1 See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the real time imaging of the brain that is 
provided by fMRI technology.  
2 Id. 
3 Mark Harris, MRI Lie Detectors, IEEE SPECTRUM (Aug. 2010), http://spectrum.ieee. 
org/biomedical/imaging/mri-lie-detectors/ (“To the accompaniment of various clicks and 
clacks, a screen above my head flashes a series of questions in front of my eyes.”). 
4 See Langleben, infra note 44. 
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have begun to correlate the activity of certain parts of the brain with 
certain behavior, such as deception. One application of such technology 
is the creation of a new lie detector which could take the place of the 
polygraph — an instrument that has been largely discredited in the legal 
field.5 
Currently, entrepreneurs are marketing the latest lie detection 
technology.6 The marketing of such research raises important questions 
about whether the state of the science has matured to such a degree that 
the company claims are warranted. Most of the legal scholarship on 
fMRI technology focuses on the issues that may be impacted by fMRI 
lie detection.7 However, little legal attention has been given to the 
commercial advertisement of the technology.8 This Note will focus on 
the online advertisement of the technology, arguing that both No Lie 
MRI and Cephos Corporation are marketing functional neuroimaging in 
a manner that violates consumer protection law under the Federal Trade 
Act. 
Part II of this Note will examine the science behind the nascent 
field of fMRI. Part III will then discuss the theoretical applications of 
fMRI-based research and the importance of decisive action by the 
Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter “FTC”). Part IV will explicate 
the FTC’s regulatory framework as it pertains to deceptive advertising. 
Part V of the Note will describe the specific claims made by both of the 
leading marketers of fMRI lie detection, namely No Lie MRI, Inc. and 
Cephos Corp., while Part VI will explain why these companies’ claims 
violate the FTC’s consumer protection laws regarding the advertisement 
of commercial products. Finally, Part VII will propose solutions that the 
FTC should adopt to correct the deceptive advertising. 
 
5 See discussion of polygraph evidence, infra Part II.A. 
6 The two primary companies that have marketed neuroscience technologies are No Lie 
MRI, Inc., and Cephos Corporation. See CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2010); NO LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
7 As of September 23, 2010, a LexisNexis search for: fMRI or “functional MRI” within 
twenty words of “lie detection” yielded forty-nine results; an impressive result for a narrow 
topic within the fledgling field of “neurolaw.”  
8 Consumer protection issues appear to have only been raised once, and briefly. See 
Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and Mapping Brain Function: A Historical 
Approach, 33 AM. J. L. AND MED. 193, 226 (2007).   
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II. THE SCIENCE BEHIND FMRI 
A. The Polygraph’s Alleged Bigger Brother 
For decades, the primary device for detecting deception has been 
the polygraph. In the legal setting, polygraphs have received negative 
treatment from the United States Supreme Court for their limited 
reliability.9 In United States. v. Scheffer,10 the Court noted that there is 
no agreement among scientists as to the accuracy rate of polygraph 
tests.11 The Court’s ruling coincided with the majority of states enacting 
per se rules against the admissibility of polygraph evidence.12 However, 
the polygraph nevertheless continues to remain pertinent to post-
conviction issues such as probation.13 
The polygraph’s failure to gain acceptance can largely be attributed 
to the physiological responses it measures. The polygraph functions by 
measuring physiological responses such as pulse, blood pressure, and 
galvanic response.14 One of the more popular means by which to 
measure the physiological responses is through asking comparison 
questions (also known as a comparison question test).”15 Physiological 
responses are evaluated by asking and comparing different types of 
questions including any relevant questions (e.g., “Did you commit the 
murder on March 4, 2010?”), control questions that do not deal with the 
 
9 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See, e.g., State v. Domicz, 907 A.2d 395, 411 (N.J. 2006) (stating that thirty-one 
states currently have a per se rule against polygraph evidence or have not addressed the 
issue).  
13 For example, the Colorado Department of Public Safety conducted a study that it 
claimed demonstrated the polygraph’s ability to spot high-risk behaviors in adult sex 
offenders. See KIM ENGLISH ET AL., COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, THE VALUE OF 
POLYGRAPH TESTING IN SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 21 (Dec. 2000), available at 
http://dcj.state.co.us/ors/pdf/docs/revisedpolyrpt6.pdf. 
14
 See also Kati Singel, Origin of the Modern Polygraph, UNIV. OF MARY 
WASHINGTON, http://www.umw.edu/hisa/resources/Student%20Projects/Singel/students. 
umw.edu/_ksing2os/polygraph/origin.html (last updated Apr. 10 2005). 
15 See COMM. TO REVIEW THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, THE NAT’L 
ACAD. OF SCIS., THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 74 (2003), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10420&page=R1 [hereinafter POLYGRAPH 
REPORT]; William G. Iacono, Effective Policing: Understanding How Polygraph Tests Work 
and are Used, Criminal Justice and Behavior, 35 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR 1295, 
1295 (2008). 
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particular event (e.g., “Have you ever taken something that did not 
belong to you?”), and irrelevant questions (e.g., “Are you sitting on a 
chair?”).16 Deceptive individuals are expected to show heightened 
physiological responses to the relevant questions, whereas truthful 
individuals are predicted to show the opposite pattern of response; that 
is, they will demonstrate a heightened response to the control 
questions.17 A pattern of consistently heightened responses to the 
relevant questions rather than to the control questions allows the 
examiner to infer deception.18 
One of the primary reasons why the legal community has not 
embraced the polygraph may be because of the inherent problems 
associated with measuring physiological responses, and the lack of 
well-developed theoretical models of the physiological processes 
underlying the peripheral measurements taken by the polygraph.19 
Physiological responses are, in some sense, removed from the decision 
to lie since responses like sweating and pulse are part of the peripheral 
nervous system that can be triggered by a variety of stimuli, apart from 
the act of engaging in deception. The difficulty with the polygraph test 
is that there inherently exists an ambiguity in its findings as to whether 
the response is due to deception or other physiological responses that 
may be associated with truthfulness.20 Another shortcoming of the 
polygraph is the difficulty in applying it outside of the laboratory. In its 
investigatory findings, The National Academy of Sciences concluded 
that ambiguity associated with the real world examinee population — as 
opposed to the laboratory subject population — almost certainly limits 
accuracy when the polygraph test is applied outside the laboratory.21 
Neuroimaging machines, on the other hand, are viewed as 
providing a more direct measurement of deception because they 
measure the physiology of the brain itself, as opposed to the physiology 
of the peripheral nervous system.22 Thus, in some sense, neuroimaging 
 
16 Gershon Ben-Shakhar, A Critical Review of Control Question Test (CQT), in 
HANDBOOK OF POLYGRAPH TESTING 4 (Murray Kleiner ed., 2002), available at 
http://www.openu.ac.il/Personal_sites/Gershon-Ben-Shakhar/CQTCHAP4.pdf. 
17 Id. at 4-5. 
18 Id. at 5. 
19 See POLYGRAPH REPORT, supra note 15, at 93. 
20 Id. at 4. 
21 Id. 
22 See Singel, supra note 14. 
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machines like fMRIs seek to go to the “source” of the lie, i.e. to the 
brain of the individual where the conscious decision to deceive the 
examiner presumably took place.23 
A multitude of recent studies have demonstrated an ability to 
identify certain regions of the brain associated with active deception 
through fMRI technology. This type of lie detection attempts to uncover 
information about what an individual knows by seeking to identify 
specific brain patterns that are believed to be more active when an 
individual engages in conscious deception.24 The accuracy of predicting 
deception currently varies; however, some studies claim to have reached 
ninety percent accuracy.25 Two companies—No Lie MRI, Inc. 
(hereinafter “No Lie MRI”) and Cephos Corp. (hereinafter “Cephos”)—
have already begun to commercialize and market fMRI technology, 
allowing people to be scanned in an attempt to prove their innocence.26 
These companies operate websites touting their ability to detect 
deception. Their claims are strong enough that one must ask whether the 
advertising of their services constitutes deceptive advertising. The first 
step in determining whether there is false advertising is to explain how 
fMRI technology operates. 
B. How Does Functional Brain Imaging Work? 
fMRI scanning utilizes magnets to detect changes in the levels of 
oxygenated blood in the brain.27 Active neurons utilize oxygen and, 
therefore, require a greater amount of hemoglobin-rich blood to provide 
them with the oxygen required to function.28 Computers can interpret the 
difference between the way that deoxygenated blood (i.e. blood that has 
been “used” by the brain) and oxygenated hemoglobin (i.e. blood that 
 
23 However, as will be discussed in Part V, fMRI lie detection suffers from the same 
difficulties as the polygraph insofar as applying it to individuals outside the laboratory 
setting. 
24 See Langleben, infra note 44. 
25 F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Imaging, 58 
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605 (2005). Steven Laken, the chief executive officer of Cephos, 
is a co-author of Kozel’s study; therefore, it should be noted that there may be a conflict of 
interest.  
26 See generally CEPHOS CORP., supra note 6; NO LIE MRI, supra note 6. 
27 See David G. Norris, Principles of Magnetic Resonance Assessment of Brain 
Function, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 794, 794-95 (2006). 
28 Id. 
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has not yet been “used” by the brain) respond to the magnets.29 This 
difference is referred to as the Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent 
(hereinafter “BOLD”) effect.30 The underlying assumption is that an 
increase in BOLD signifies an increase in blood flow and it is believed 
to indicate neural activity.31 fMRI scans are administered while the 
person being scanned performs various tasks, such as answering a 
question, observing a picture, or hearing a sound. Scans occurring 
during these activities reveal the parts of the brain being activated 
during the specific tasks.32 
Because of its complexity, many people misunderstand exactly 
how fMRI works. Thus, it may be helpful to illustrate the process by 
way of an analogy. Imagine a worldwide tsunami warning system that 
overlays colors onto a map of the world, with the color of a geographic 
location varying in response to the perceived level of threat. To 
accomplish this, instruments (seismographs) are used to measure 
vibrations within the earth.33 The designers of the system must establish 
a threshold level of vibration specifying the point at which a warning 
will not register on the map. This threshold is critical: set the threshold 
too low and the warning will activate too frequently; set it too high and 
it may miss important vibrations. Yet, it is important to understand that 
the threshold is in a sense arbitrary, because it is not a natural 
phenomenon. After a threshold is set and the map is created, one must 
then make the initial inference that the increased vibrations reliably 
 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 798. Note that there are other technologies that similarly leverage physiological 
response to increased neuronal activities. For example, PET and SPECT scanning operate 
by recording the distribution of radioactive tracers that are injected into the bloodstream, 
ultimately ending up in the brain. These tracers are attached to molecules that the brain will 
use, most notably either oxygen or glucose. Therefore, more tracers accumulate in parts of 
the brain that are active because active neurons in the brain require blood and glucose for 
energy. These technologies as well as magnetoencephalography were in use before the 
fMRI. However, neither has been attempted to be adapted as a lie detection device, 
presumably because their spatial resolution (i.e. the quality of the data) is lower than that of 
fMRI machines. See generally David G. Norris, Principles of Magnetic Resonance 
Assessment of Brain Function, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 794, 794 (2006) 
(discussing problems with the spatial and temporal resolution of different imaging 
technologies).  
32 See infra Part III.C for a discussion of Langleben’s playing card study.  
33 See Earthquake Glossary, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERV., http://earthquake.usgs. 
gov/learn/glossary/?term=seismograph (last visited Dec. 4, 2010). 
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indicate an increase in activity of the earth’s plates, rather than some 
other phenomena, such as a methane gas eruption. With that inference 
made, one must make a second inference: that an increase in activity of 
the earth’s plates corresponds to an increased likelihood of a tsunami. 
Since these inferences occur after looking at the map, the inferences 
drawn must rely to some extent on the initial threshold vibration level.34 
Likewise, for regions of the brain to show up as “active” on the 
fMRI radiological images (i.e., as colors), the investigator must specify 
a threshold level of fMRI data that qualifies as the BOLD threshold.35 In 
our tsunami analogy, this would be the threshold level of vibration that 
is required for the vibration data to appear on the map as a warning area. 
The lower the vibration level required for warnings, the more warnings 
that will register on the map. Likewise, with fMRI scanning, the lower 
the threshold, the more regions appear as “active” colored regions on 
the scan.36 In this sense, an individual analyzing an fMRI image is very 
much like the individual looking at the map in that she depends, 
whether consciously or not, on the threshold determination when 
drawing subsequent inferences about the subject’s physiological or 
psychological state. 
III. WHY THE FTC SHOULD ACT 
The FTC has taken a proactive approach to issues regarding the 
advertising of health or medical products. In its Deception Statement, 
the FTC concluded that it automatically deems claims or omissions to 
be material in advertising if they “ . . . significantly involve health, 
safety, or other areas with which the reasonable consumer would be 
concerned.”37 However, it is unclear if fMRI-based lie detection will be 
viewed as involving health or safety per se. In other words, since fMRI-
 
34 It is worth noting that, even without the use of a map, the same inferences are 
required. That is, a threshold level of activity must be set such that a reading will trigger an 
alarm or alert of some kind.  
35 See Appendix 1 for an example of an fMRI image. 
36 As previously stated, the use of a map is not necessary. As long as the fMRI 
companies claim to “verify” the veracity of a given statement, it will be necessary for them 
to specify a threshold reading that would allow them to conclude that the subject is lying. 
This is an inherent necessity in their claim that they can verify. The problems with these 
claims of “truth verification” will be described infra Part IV.B as they pertain to consumer 
protection violations.  
37 See Deception Statement, infra note 69, at 182. 
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based lie detection is not a drug or device that claims to treat illness or 
disease, it is unclear whether it falls into the category of health or safety 
products that would trigger stricter FTC scrutiny. Nevertheless, the 
stakes regarding the advertising of fMRI-based lie detection 
technologies could not be higher. One need only look at potential ways 
that a bona fide fMRI lie detection device would influence our society 
to appreciate the need for the FTC to approach this issue with urgency. 
If consumers are allowed to embrace a flawed conception of fMRI 
technology based on the advertising of No Lie MRI and Cephos, many 
of the issues that would arise with a bona fide lie detector threaten to 
materialize here as well. 
A. Multiple Constitutional Issues at Stake 
Neuroimaging, whether anatomical or functional in nature, raises 
serious concerns about the right to privacy as well as a defendant’s 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and self-incrimination, respectively.38 Can fMRI studies that 
show possible deception be admitted without the consent of the 
defendant? Attorney and former professor of biology John New points 
out that “an initial question that must be asked is whether results of 
brain activity measurement should be considered by the legal system to 
be physical evidence or actual testimony by the individual.”39 Treating 
fMRI data as physical evidence, as is the custom for DNA or 
fingerprints, is an attractive approach given that fMRI data is a physical 
measurement of a concrete, tangible phenomenon.40 However, if 
classified as physical evidence, the recording of brain activity by way of 
neuroimaging could be compelled in criminal cases and used against the 
accused by the prosecution.41 On the other hand, if neuroimaging 
evidence is considered testimony, then the argument could be made that 
any inclusion would violate the defendant’s right against self-
incrimination. Regardless, the legal community will have to determine 
which strategy best promotes justice. 
 
38 See generally Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal 
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301 (2006). Polygraph testing has also been subject to 
questions as to whether it infringes on an individual’s Fifth Amendment rights.  
39 John New, If You Could Read My Mind, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 179, 193 (2008). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 194. 
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The powerful constitutional issues discussed above should prompt 
the FTC to act swiftly to ensure that those marketing and conducting 
what they believe are fMRI lie detectors actually accomplish what they 
promise. Arguments can be made that the benefits of an actual fMRI-
based lie detector would outweigh these constitutional concerns. 
However, it is clear that the benefits of the technology in its current 
state do not outweigh these concerns. Allowing current fMRI-based 
methods for detecting deception to be marketed as bona fide lie 
detection devices could alter the constitutional landscape while 
providing little in return. 
B. Government Involvement in fMRI development 
fMRI-based lie detection could also change the way that 
governments interrogate suspects. United States government agencies, 
like the Central Intelligence Agency, are interested in using cutting-
edge neuroscience for interrogation.42 However, the companies remain 
quite secretive of their connections to the government.43 The Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded a widely cited 
study by University of Pennsylvania neuroscientist Daniel Langleben.44 
The study is cited on No Lie MRI’s “publications” section of their 
website.45 In the study, Langleben presented participants with an 
envelope containing two playing cards, as well twenty dollars.46 The 
participants were shown a semi-random series of playing card images 
displayed on a projector that could be viewed by the participant while 
being scanned in the fMRI machine.47 The participants were instructed 
 
42 See Ian Sample & David Adam, The Brain Can’t Lie, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/life/feature/story/0,13026,1088572,00.html (last visited Nov. 26, 
2010). 
43 In an interview, No Lie MRI’s CEO Joel Huizenga stated that, “We are dealing with 
the military. The guys in the field are asking for this technology. They want to know 
whether people are telling them the truth or telling them lies.” However, Huizenga “refuses 
to provide any specifics, other than saying that No Lie MRI hopes shortly to secure 
government funding for a multimillion-dollar, 1200-person study.” Harris, supra note 3. 
44 See Daniel D. Langleben, Telling Truth From Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast 
Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262, 271 (2005) (acknowledging that 
DARPA provided funding for the study). 
45 Press and Publications, NO LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/pressNPubs/ 
Publications.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).  
46 See Langleben, supra note 44, at 263. 
47 Id. 
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to signify whether the card on the screen was the card they possessed; 
however, they were also specifically instructed to deny possession of 
one of the two cards they possessed when they saw that card projected.48 
Langleben reported being able to determine whether the individuals 
were being deceptive based on the fMRI data.49 
Given the inherent inadequacy of using current fMRI technology 
as a device for detecting deception, the FTC should take seriously the 
marketing of the technology for such purposes. The government is a 
consumer that, though sophisticated, may also need consumer 
protection, as it is often the consumer of cutting-edge technology that is 
developed or discovered in universities. Moreover, state politicians and 
agencies may not be as sophisticated or well-versed in the limitations of 
fMRI-based lie detection, and may believe the strong claims that 
marketers of the technology put forth on their websites. 
C. Powerful Findings Raise Questions for the Criminal Justice 
System 
fMRI technology also applies to issues outside the scope of lie 
detection. In fact, a new area of law has been coined called “neurolaw” 
to account for the vast influence that modern neuroscience has had on 
our legal system.50 Recent neuroimaging studies have identified a 
network of brain regions involved in moral processing that may alter 
our notions of free will and moral blameworthiness.51 For example, 
researchers at the University of Southern California found that certain 
areas of the brain’s cortex were “activated when subjects performed 
tasks involving moral conundrums.”52 Other neuroimaging studies have 
found that patients with lesions in the prefrontal cortex (the portion of 
the brain behind the forehead) show impaired moral judgment in 
emotional dilemmas.53 
 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the Brain, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI & TECH. 27, 34-35 
(2010) (describing the birth of “neurolaw.”). 
51 See generally Stephan Hamann & Carla L. Harenski, Neural Correlates of Regulating 
Negative Emotions Related to Moral Violations, 30 NEUROIMAGE 313 (2006).  
52 Adrian Raine & Yaling Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral Reasoning and 
Antisocial Behavior, 1 SOCIAL COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 203, 207 (2006).  
53 Elisa Ciaramelli et al., Selective Deficit in Personal Moral Judgment Following 
Damage to Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, 2 SOCIAL COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE 
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In addition to moral judgments, neural corollaries of other aspects 
of human cognition have been found that may likewise affect our 
theories of punishment, most notably that of intention. In 2004, 
researchers found that certain parts of the motor cortex and prefrontal 
cortex are triggered when individuals engage in intentional activities.54 
In the future, it is conceivable that defendants will voluntarily undergo 
brain scanning in order to measure if the areas of the brain that are 
known to deal with the formation of intent are functioning at the level 
expected for a healthy individual. If a defendant’s scan turns out to be 
“abnormal,” how should this affect the punishment and sentencing of 
the individual? 
The aforementioned findings pose a difficult question for those 
who view punishment by the legal system as retributivist in nature. 
More specifically, such findings may call into question whether society 
is justified in punishing the behavior of an individual when the part of 
their brain governing intent is shown to function abnormally. If the 
neural machinery of moral judgments and intent are compromised due 
to a brain injury or defect, larger questions about that individual’s 
blameworthiness arise. If neuroscience undercuts the ability to assign 
blame to certain individual actions, the retributivist theory of 
punishment may be greatly attenuated. In turn, some commentators are 
the theorizing that fMRI research could have profound changes on the 
sentencing of individuals.55 
The far-reaching impact of neuroscience findings should prompt 
the FTC to aggressively regulate fMRI marketing for improper usage. 
Failure to regulate the marketing of such products could contribute to a 
broad acceptance by judges and juries of the claims by companies like 
No Lie MRI and Cephos. Given that judges and juries have a 
tremendous capacity to influence the inner-workings of our justice 
system, the FTC should act to prevent such a scenario from unraveling. 
 
NEUROSCIENCE 84 (2007); Michael Koenigs et al., Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex 
Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgments, 446 NATURE 908 (2007).  
54 John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17 
CURRENT BIOLOGY 323 (2007); Hakwan C. Lau et al., Attention to Intention, 303 SCIENCE 
1208, 1208-10 (2004). .  
55 See Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not. Responsibility But 
Treatment, 56 KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1003-1104 (2008) (“I, too, believe that advances in 
neuroscience will change, dramatically, the criminal justice system… [W]e may see major 
changes in how crimes are investigated, in how trials are conducted, in how sentencing 
decisions are reached, and in what kinds of sentences are imposed.”). 
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IV. THE FTC FRAMEWORK FOR DECEPTIVE TRADE 
PRACTICE DETERMINATIONS 
This section will describe the FTC’s current policy with respect to 
deceptive advertising. The FTC’s policy is particularly helpful because 
many states have adopted its general framework for approaching 
deceptive marketing. 
A. History of the FTC and the FTC Act 
The Federal Trade Communications Act (hereinafter “FTC Act”) 
empowered the FTC to regulate a broad variety of trade practices.56 
However, the FTC did not always possess such broad authority. As 
enacted in 1914, the FTC was only empowered to “prevent persons, 
partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of 
competition in commerce.”57 At this point, the FTC was not charged 
with preventing deceptive practices.58 Eventually, the FTC Act would 
broaden its focus to include regulation of “unfair methods.” 
This broadening began with the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Act59 which 
amended Section Five of the FTC Act, declaring deceptive practices in 
commerce to be illegal, and empowering the FTC to challenge both 
“unfair,” as well as “deceptive” trade practices.60 The Wheeler-Lea Act 
also provided the FTC with the authority to take action against the false 
advertising of foods, drugs, and cosmetics.61 This law also specifically 
provides the FTC with the authority to issue preliminary injunctions 
against such advertisements.62 
Though Section Five of the FTC Act became — and still is — the 
primary tool by which actions are brought alleging deceptive acts, the 
original Act was a blunt instrument, generally approaching both 
“unfair” and “deceptive” practices under a single standard.63 The 
precision of FTC regulations was later sharpened somewhat by case law 
 
56 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2009). 
57 Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5(a), 38 Stat. 717, 719 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
45(a)). 
58 See generally id. 
59 Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at ch. 49, §§ 4-5, 52 Stat. 111, 114 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-57). 
62 Id. 
63 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Sterling Drug, 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963). 
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that produced a refined standard, which focused on whether or not the 
practice in question had the “tendency and capacity” to mislead.64 In the 
1965 seminal case F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,65 the Supreme 
Court articulated the standard for deceptive practices, opining that, “the 
misrepresentation of any fact, so long as it materially induces a 
purchaser’s decision to buy, is a deception prohibited by § 5.”66 
Nonetheless, as in 1914, the FTC Act remained silent as to what 
exactly “unfair” or “deceptive” meant in the context of the Act. This 
vagueness led to criticism of the FTC.67 In response to such criticism, 
the FTC issued a letter to Congress in 1984 — known as the “Deception 
Statement” — which sought to clarify the FTC’s policy on deceptive 
trade practices.68 
However, the Deception Statement qua letter had no actual legal 
authority. The legal authority of the policy set forth in the Deception 
Statement was augmented when the FTC included the entirety of the 
letter in its appendix to the FTC’s decision in In re Cliffdale 
Associates.69 By including the Deception Statement in Cliffdale 
Associates, the Deception Statement “became the legal standard which 
the Commission had to apply in all future deception cases.”70 
Federal courts have also adopted the policy explicated in the 
Deception Statement.71 Furthermore, the federal judiciary is highly 
deferential to the Commission’s findings in general.72 Additionally, the 
Deception Statement has been “widely used as guidance in the 
 
64 See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 
1994); U.S. Retail Credit Ass’n v. F.T.C., 300 F.2d 212, 221-22 (4th Cir. 1962). 
65 F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965). 
66 Id. at 387 (emphasis in original). 
67 See Richard Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47-89 
(1969). 
68 In 1980 the FTC published an “Unfairness Statement” clarifying the term “unfair 
practices,” but this is outside the scope of this paper. In re Int’l Harvester Corp., 104 F.T.C. 
949, 1070 app. n.41 (1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm. 
69 In re Cliffdale Assoc. Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. (1984) [hereinafter “Deception 
Statement”]. 
70 Amrep Corp. v. F.T.C., 768 F.2d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1985). 
71 See F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp. 33 F.3d 1088, 1096 n.19 (9th Cir. 1994); U.S. v. 
Locascio, 357 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
72 Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed’n of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1976); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. F.T.C., 807 F.2d 1381, 1384 
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987)). 
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interpretation of state consumer protection statutes. . . .”73 
Procedurally, once the Commission decides to take action against a 
party, it has two options. Part Three of the FTC Rules of Practice allows 
the FTC to file a claim for administrative adjudication.74 Alternatively, 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act allows the Commission to file a complaint 
in federal court.75 However, the focus has begun to shift to the federal 
courts as the primary means of adjudication.76 
B. The Deception Statement 
1. Generally 
To apply the FTC’s policy on deceptive trade practices to the 
advertisements for cutting-edge neuroscience products, it is first 
necessary to discuss the self-imposed requirements that the FTC must 
meet in order to bring a deceptive advertising claim. The Deception 
Statement begins by describing what it believes to be the common 
elements to all deceptive trade practices. Generally, the Commission 
will find a practice to be deceptive if: 
1. There is a representation, omission, or other practice, 
2. That misleads the consumer acting reasonably in the 
circumstances, 
3. To the consumer’s detriment.77 
The Commission supplements this standard by describing in detail 
its different aspects. 
2. Representation, Omission, or Other Practice 
The first requirement of a deceptive practice is a representation, 
omission, or practice.78 The Deception Statement provides examples of 
misleading and deceptive practices, including false oral or written 
representations, misleading price claims, sales of hazardous or 
 
73 Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers: Consumer 
Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
829, 848-49 (2006).   
74 Commencement of Proceedings, FTC Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings, 
16 C.F.R.§3.11 (2010). 
75 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2010); 16 C.F.R. § 3.2 (2010). 
76 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION HANDBOOK 41-42 (2004).  
77 See Deception Statement, supra note 69, at 183. 
78 Id. at 170.  
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systematically defective products or services without adequate 
disclosures, failure to disclose information regarding pyramid sales, use 
of bait and switch techniques, failure to perform promised services, and 
failure to meet warranty obligations.79 The Commission further states 
that a misrepresentation can be either an express or implied statement 
contrary to fact.80 The FTC has defined an “express claim” as a claim 
literally made in the advertisement.81 For example, “ABC Mouthwash 
prevents colds” is an express claim that the product will prevent colds.82 
An implied claim, as defined by the FTC, is a claim made indirectly or 
by inference.83 For example, an advertisement stating that “ABC 
Mouthwash kills the germs that cause colds” contains an implied claim 
that the product will prevent colds.84 With respect to omissions, the 
Commission states that an omission may be considered a 
misrepresentation if qualifying information necessary to prevent a 
practice, claim, representation, or reasonable expectation or belief from 
being misleading is not disclosed.85 
3. Misleading a Consumer Acting Reasonably 
The second factor that the FTC investigates is the impact of the 
practice in question from the perspective of the consumer acting 
reasonably under the circumstances.86 If the representation or practice 
affects or is directed primarily to a particular group, the FTC examines 
reasonableness from the perspective of that group.87 Generally, the FTC 
will find deception if the average consumer would be deceived, if a 
significant number of consumers would be misled, or if the 
advertisement is aimed at a particularly vulnerable audience that is 
 
79 Id..  
80 Id.  
81 Frequently Asked Advertising Questions: A Guide for Small Business, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/adv/bus35.shtm (last visited Nov. 29, 
2010). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See Deception Statement, supra note 69 at 170. See In re Int’l Harvester Corp., 104 
F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984) (making clear that the omission of information about a product may 
be deceptive in certain circumstances). 
86 See Deception Statement, supra note 69 at 171. 
87 Id. 
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likely to be misled.88 
4. Materiality Requirement 
The third factor — the most complex of the three — asks whether 
or not the representation, omission, or practice is “material” in nature.89 
As the FTC describes: 
The basic question [concerning the materiality requirement] is 
whether the act or practice is likely to affect the consumer’s conduct 
or decision with regard to a product or service. If so, the practice is 
material, and consumer injury is likely, because consumers are likely 
to have chosen differently but for the deception. In many instances, 
materiality, and hence injury, can be presumed from the nature of the 
practice. In other instances, evidence of materiality may be 
necessary.90 
With respect to the materiality of a representation, omission, or 
practice, the FTC “will not generally require extrinsic evidence 
concerning the materiality of a challenged claim.”91 Furthermore, courts 
have upheld agency decisions even in light of expert testimony that 
there was no deception of individual consumers.92 In both In re 
Thompson Medical Co. and Kraft v. F.T.C., the Commission concluded 
that, with respect to extrinsic evidence: 
1. Express claims will not require extrinsic proof on the 
meaning of the advertisement, 
2. Obvious implied claims, i.e. those that can be reasonably 
inferred from the express claims, no extrinsic proof will be 
required, though it will be considered if available; and 
3. Implied claims that cannot be deciphered from examining 
the face of the ad will require some type of intrinsic proof.93 
5. Materiality Does Not Require Intent to Deceive 
The Commission has maintained that scienter is not required for a 
 
88 DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW 727 
(Thomson West 2008 Ed.).  
89 See Deception Statement, supra note 69 at 171. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 192-93. 
92 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. F.T.C., 275 F.2d 680, 682 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 
U.S. 819 (1960).  
93 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 88, at 768-69 (citing Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 
F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984)). 
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finding of deception.94 This policy has been affirmed in a number of 
decisions, including F.T.C. v. Verity International, Ltd., where the court 
stated that “deception need not be made with intent to deceive; it is 
enough that the representations or practices were likely to mislead 
consumers acting reasonably.”95 The rationale for not requiring scienter 
is explicated in F.T.C. v. Freecom Communications, where the court 
found that Section Five of the FTC Act is meant to protect the 
consumer, thus warranting a focus on how the acts or practices will 
affect the consumer, not on the intent of the defendant.96 Since 
materially deceptive claims under the FTC Act are presumed as a matter 
of law to cause injury to consumers, the FTC is not obligated to proffer 
evidence of the risk of injury.97 Thus, the FTC’s framework bears a 
striking similarity to statutes imposing strict liability. 
6. Materiality May At Times Be Presumed, Even Without Injury 
Though certain parts of the Deception Statement appear to create a 
requirement of actual consumer injury, the Commission has not 
required actual injury for a finding of materiality.98 The Deception 
Statement itself disavows the injury requirement, affirming previous 
Commission decisions that abandoned such a requirement.99 From the 
Deception Statement, FTC decisions, and case law, it is clear that there 
are four circumstances where the Commission will presume materiality. 
Specifically, materiality will be presumed where the alleged violator: 
1. Made an expressly false claim; 
2. Should have known that the consumer needs information 
that was not disclosed; 
 
94 F.T.C. v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2005). 
95 F.T.C. v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 
1278 (2007). 
96 F.T.C. v. Freecom Commc’ns, 401 F.3d 1192, 1202, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005).  
97 See In re N. Am. Philips Corp., 111 F.T.C. 150 (1988); In re Gen. Nutrition, Inc., 113 
F.T.C. 146, 243 (1986). 
98 See F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934). 
99 In re Cliffdale Assoc. Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 152 (1984) (citing F.T.C. v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 387 (1965); In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 368 
(1981), aff’d as modified, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982) (defining materiality to include 
anything that affects purchasing decision, and holding that materiality will be found if post-
purchase use of product is affected by advertisement); In re Simeon Mgmt. Corp., 87 F.T.C. 
1184, 1229 (1976), aff’d, 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978) (disavowing any requirement of a 
specific finding that actual injury has occurred)).  
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3. Intended an implied claim; or 
4. Made a claim in any of several areas generally established as 
relevant to consumers, including the purpose of the product 
or service at issue; its efficacy, quality or performance; 
health or safety issues; cost; durability; or a warranty.100 
In International Harvester, the FTC explained that “. . .implied 
claims are material if they pertain to the central characteristics of the 
product, such as its safety, cost, or fitness for the purposes sold.”101 The 
rationale for abandoning actual injury is explained in Freecom 
Communications, where the Court stated that “[n]either proof of 
consumer reliance nor consumer injury is necessary to establish a § 
5violation . . .Otherwise the law would preclude the FTC from taking 
preemptive action against those responsible for deceptive acts or 
practices, contrary to § 5’sprophylactic purpose.”102 
The FTC has linked deception by omission to materiality, stating 
that, “depending on the facts, information pertaining to the central 
characteristics of the product or service will be presumed material.”103 
The Commission listed information dealing with the product’s purpose 
and efficacy as being material.104 
In Kraft, Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
the Commission was justified in finding that the claims in Kraft’s 
advertisements were material if they were deemed to be important to 
consumers and would influence the consumer’s purchasing decisions.105 
In Kraft, the Commission found that the consumer had significant health 
concerns that were triggered by Kraft’s claim that their cheese slices 
were superior to imitation slices in terms of their calcium content.106 The 
court therefore ruled that the Commission properly inferred that Kraft’s 
claims of superiority were material.107 The court also affirmed the 
Commission’s finding that the advertisement was deceptive.108 
In F.T.C. v. QT, Inc, a Federal District Court considered whether a 
 
100 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 76, at 13.  
101 In re Int’l Harvester, Corp., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1056-57 (1984).  
102 F.T.C. v Freecom Commc’ns, 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005). 
103 See Deception Statement, supra note 69, at 190. 
104 Id. 
105 Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311, 322 (7th Cir. 1992).  
106 Id. at 324.  
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 322. 
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bracelet advertisement, which claimed to provide immediate pain relief, 
was a deceptive marketing activity.109 The manufacturer claimed in an 
advertisement that the bracelet provided immediate, significant, or 
complete pain relief,110 and that scientific tests proved its pain relief 
claims.111 The Court upheld the FTC’s ruling that the advertisement’s 
claim was material, and that the advertisement was likely to mislead 
reasonable consumers.112 To understand both the FTC and the courts’ 
rulings in both Kraft and QT, it is necessary to discuss the substantiation 
requirement imposed on advertisers when they make claims like the one 
at issue in QT. 
7. Substantiation Policy 
The FTC’s Deception Statement and the related case law provide 
general guidance for approaching deceptive advertising issues. Even if 
the first and third requirements of the deception statement are satisfied, 
(i.e. the requirement that the advertiser make a representation or 
omission and that such representation is material) the question of 
whether the advertisement is likely to mislead the consumer may still be 
difficult to answer. In order to determine whether an advertisement is 
likely to mislead a consumer, the FTC has employed two tools: the 
“falsity theory” and the “reasonable basis” theory.113 The falsity theory 
requires that the FTC prove that the claims made in the advertisement 
are demonstrably false, and the burden of proof is on the FTC.114 The 
reasonable basis theory requires that advertisers have a “reasonable 
basis” for any express or implied claims that their advertisement 
conveys.115 This policy was affirmed in the FTC’s Statement on 
Advertising Substantiation, which states that “failure to possess and rely 
upon a reasonable basis for objective claims constitutes an unfair and 
deceptive act or practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
 
109 F.T.C. v. QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 512 F.3d 858 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
110 Id. at 960. 
111 Id. at 961-62. 
112 Id. at 975. 
113 See F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citations 
omitted). 
114
 See id.  
115 Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. F.T.C., 695 F.2d 681, 693 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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Commission Act.”116 
Initially, the FTC’s rationale for requiring substantiation was that 
unsubstantiated claims unfairly require the consumer to gamble on 
whether the product will meet the expectations conveyed by the 
advertisement.117 However, the FTC’s current favored rationale for the 
substantiation requirement is that unsubstantiated claims are inherently 
deceiving.118 The FTC’s reasoning is that, because the advertiser has not 
disclosed a material fact, the affirmative representation lacks the 
support that would be presumed absent some qualification.119 
For example, the FTC held that Firestone Tire Company’s 
blanketed claims that its tire “stops 25% quicker” needed to be 
sufficiently substantiated by tests on a variety of road conditions.120 
Since Firestone had only tested its tires in one set of conditions, the 
FTC ruled that the company did not have a reasonable basis to 
substantiate its claim.121 Likewise, in QT, the defendant company was 
required to have a “reasonable basis” for their claim that the bracelet 
would provide pain relief to the wearer.122 Since QT, Inc. did not have 
the appropriate evidence to back up its claim, the FTC found that the 
unsubstantiated claims would likely mislead consumers.123 As such, an 
advertiser’s failure to have a reasonable basis for an advertisement’s 
claims at the time the claims are made renders the advertising 
deceptive.124 
With respect to the level of substantiation required, the advertiser 
must have at least the level of support that it explicitly claims in its 
advertisements, and will also be required to provide support for any 
implied claims.125 If an advertisement makes express representations 
 
116 49 Fed. Reg. 30, 999 (Aug 2, 1984), reprinted in 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 39,060, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/ad3subst.htm.  
117 See In re Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 67-69 (1972). 
118 Am. Home Prods. Corp., 695 F.2d at 692. 
119 Id. 
120 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 418 (1972). 
121 Id. at 427. 
122 F.T.C. v. QT, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
123 Id. at 965. 
124 See Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 773-774 (opining that the advertisements 
were deceptive because Thompson did not have a reasonable basis to back up the claims in 
its advertisement).  
125 49 Fed. Reg. 30, 999 (Aug 2, 1984), reprinted in 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 39,060, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/ad3subst.htm.  
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regarding the level of substantiation, (e.g. “according to clinical studies” 
or “laboratory testing proves”) the FTC will require that the advertiser 
substantiate such claims.126 An advertiser claiming that a scientific 
consensus exists on a certain issue will be required to provide evidence 
of such a consensus. Advertisements claiming that “research 
proves . . .” or that “laboratory science has perfected . . .” will need to 
be substantiated by competent scientific proof.127 
In practice, FTC substantiation cases generally fall into two main 
categories: claims regarding health and safety, and claims regarding a 
product’s efficacy.128 Both require competent and reliable evidence such 
as research, studies, or other evidence from professionals in the relative 
area, conducted and evaluated by qualified individuals using generally 
accepted procedures.129 
Of particular importance to fMRI lie detection is the FTC’s policy 
that an advertisement may be deemed deceptive if there are unresolved 
scientific questions relevant to the advertisement’s claim that it omits or 
ignores.130 In National Commission on Egg Nutrition v. F.T.C.,131 the 
Seventh Circuit upheld the FTC’s finding of deceptive advertising.132 
The FTC had found that the Egg Commission’s advertising claim that 
there was “no evidence” that eggs contribute to heart disease was 
deceptive.133 Because credible scientific studies did not support the 
contention that egg consumption posed no health risk, but rather that 
credible scientific evidence linked egg consumption to an increased risk 
of cardiovascular disease, the FTC concluded that there was no 
reasonable basis for the Egg Commission’s claims, consequently ruling 
them deceptive.134 For respondents to make no mention of the scientific 
 
126 In re Removatron Int’l Corp, 111 F.T.C. 206, 297 (1985).  
127 Id. at 298; In re Porter & Dietsch, 90 F.T.C. 770, 865 (1977). 
128 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 9 
(2009). 
129 See In re Novartis Corp., 127 F.T.C. 580, 670 (1996), aff’d, 223 F.3d 783 (D.C. Cir. 
1996).  
130 In re Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 193 (1976), enforced as 
modified, 570 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that the National Commission on Egg 
Nutrition cannot ignore the fact that many scientists cite studies demonstrating that the 
ingestion of eggs may increase heart disease).  
131 Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. F.T.C., 570 F.2d 157, 165 (7th Cir. 1977). 
132 Id. 
133 In re Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C.at 187-190. 
134 Id.  
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controversy surrounding this issue was, as the Court stated, patently 
false and misleading.135 
Furthermore, a determination of the level of substantiation that an 
advertiser must have is made on a case-by-case basis.136 The FTC 
considers “the type of claim, the product, the consequences of a false 
claim, the benefits of a truthful claim, the cost of developing 
substantiation for the claim, and the amount of substantiation experts in 
the field believe is reasonable” in order to determine what comprises a 
reasonable basis.137 
V. THE CLAIMS 
Both No Lie MRI and Cephos make claims regarding the science 
behind fMRI, the legal admissibility of fMRI, the observer 
independence of fMRI and the scientific community’s support of fMRI-
based lie detection. These claims will be discussed in turn. This Note 
will then analyze the claims under the FTC’s approach to deceptive 
advertising as discussed in Part IV. 
A. Claims Regarding the State of fMRI-based Lie Detection 
Both No Lie MRI and Cephos make very strong claims that their 
fMRI technology can detect deception. No Lie MRI claims that “[t]he 
technology used by No Lie MRI represents the first and only direct 
measure of truth verification and lie detection in human history!”138 
Likewise, Cephos claims that it has developed “the latest, most 
scientifically advanced, brain imaging techniques for scientifically 
accurate lie detection.”139 
The companies’ representations fall into a category of 
representation that the FTC will presume to be material: those 
pertaining to the efficacy of the product. Both companies bill 
themselves as providing “truth verification” fMRI services. For 
example, No Lie MRI states that it provides “unbiased methods for the 
 
135 Id. 
136 49 Fed. Reg. 30, 999 (Aug 2, 1984), reprinted in 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 39,060, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/ad3subst.htm. 
137 Id.   
138 NO LIE MRI, supra note 6. 
139 CEPHOS CORP., supra note 6.  
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detection of deception and other information stored in the brain” 140 
Furthermore, No Lie MRI claims to utilize techniques that “bypass 
conscious cognitive processing” by measuring “the activity of the 
central nervous system (brain and spinal cord) rather than the peripheral 
nervous system (as polygraph testing does).”141 These statements appear 
directly above an fMRI image of the brain and directly to the left of a 
photograph of a sophisticated-looking piece of medical imaging 
equipment that is presumably an fMRI machine.142 This fMRI brain 
image is annotated, with certain parts of the brain labeled as “lie” areas 
while another labeled as “truth” areas.143 Cephos is no less zealous in its 
declaration of lie detection capabilities. On its website’s landing page, 
Cephos states that “[t]he source of lying is in the brain — this is what 
Cephos measures with our truth verification brain imaging service using 
fMRI technology. We provide independent, scientific validation that 
someone is telling the truth.”144 
B. Claims Regarding Legal Admissibility 
Both Cephos and No Lie MRI make an additional claim regarding 
the purpose of their services: to be used in a court of law. Cephos states 
that “[w]e have offered expert testimony and have presented fMRI 
evidence in court”145 and that “Cephos fMRI lie detection evidence is 
likely admissible in court.”146 Likewise, No Lie MRI states that their 
results “could be used in a similar manner to DNA testing by adding the 
verification of an individual’s mental record. It would also potentially 
be possible for a witness to validate his or her own statements to the 
court.”147 
 
140 NO LIE MRI, supra note 6.  
141 Id. 
142 See id. 
143 See Appendix 3 for a screenshot of the website. 
144 The Technology Behind Lie Detection, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp. 
com/lie-detection/index.php#lie (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
145 Id. 
146 fMRI Testing & Legal Admissibility, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/lie-
detection/index.php#admissibility (last visited Nov. 30, 2010). 
147 Customers – Lawyers, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/customers/Lawyers.htm 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
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C. Claims Regarding Observer Independence and Automation 
Both companies expressly claim that their services are entirely 
processed by computers, with no human intervention. Cephos claims 
that “[a]ll ‘readings’ are performed by computers; thus, no human 
interpretations are required.”148 Likewise, No Lie MRI states that its 
offering is fully automated and observer independent and therefore 
objective.149 Claims of computer automation and observer independence 
are important representations, for such assertions portray the technology 
as being able to objectively detect deception without the need for human 
intervention. 
D. Claims Regarding Scientific Credibility and Support 
Furthermore, both companies claim that the scientific community 
backs their fMRI lie detection series. Specifically, No Lie MRI lists a 
“Scientific Board” comprised of three university professors.150 No Lie 
MRI also has a separate page listing scientific publications.151 Cephos 
claims that a host of academic groups, including those at Harvard, 
Columbia, and the University of Pennsylvania, have all concluded that 
fMRI technology can distinguish between lies and truth.152 
VI. ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS UNDER FTC DECEPTIVE 
ADVERTISING PRINCIPLES 
A. Companies’ Claims That Their Technology Can Directly 
Detect Deception May be False and Unsubstantiated 
The FTC should have a relatively easy time proving that the 
companies have no substantiation for their claims that they can directly 
detect deception. As discussed above, current fMRI technology does not 
 
148 Working with Cephos, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/lie-
detection/index.php#working (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
149 Product Overview, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/products/Overview.htm (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
150 Scientific Board, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/aboutUs/ScienceBoard.htm (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
151 Scientific Publications, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/pressNPubs/Publications 
.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
152 fMRI Testing and Legal Admissibility, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp. 
com/lie-detection/index.php#admissibility (last visited Dec. 4, 2010). 
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directly measure the neuronal activity of the brain.153 In other words, 
fMRI technology does not measure the firing of neurons in the brain. 
Rather, as used in brain imaging, fMRI measures changes in blood flow 
to the brain.154 This necessarily requires that any results gleaned from 
fMRI data depend on a chain of inferences.155 
Specifically, this chain of inferences requires an initial threshold 
determination of what constitutes the BOLD data that will be 
represented on the fMRI image.156 The boundaries for what is or is not 
depicted in fMRI images are determined by “hemodynamic 
modeling.”157 The BOLD signal is part of this modeling, and is 
represented in a complex statistical algorithm where certain variables 
must be specified.158 In coming to a conclusion about what the image 
represents, we necessarily infer that BOLD data accurately represents 
increased neuronal activity. A second inference is required, namely that 
the neuronal activity depicted by the BOLD data is relevant to 
understanding and explaining deceptive brain states. A third inference 
requires us to conclude that a reading indicating a deceptive brain state 
is itself sufficient to establish that the subject has objectively lied. 
Arguably, the third inference is not required. This is because fMRI may 
be used to show a lack of activation in a certain area, that is, an area 
 
153 See supra Part II.B. 
154 See id. (discussing how fMRI measures changes in blood flow which are believed to 
indicate neural activity). 
155
 Much of the inspiration for the explication, as well as the diagram in Appendix 4 is 
taken from Neal Feigenson’s article describing what he believes is the chain of inferences 
underlying fMRI scans. See Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On 
the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.L. IN CONTEXT 233, 239 (2006). 
However, my chain of inferences is different. Feigenson describes the first step as being an 
inference, which I believe is misleading. On an abstract level, apart from how the 
technology is applied across studies, a threshold determination is required. Additionally, I 
believe that it is crucial to include the final inference regarding the finding of fact that is the 
ultimate step for anyone considering fMRI data in the legal context.  
156 See Appendix 4 for a chart of the inferences. 
157 See generally RICHARD S. J. FRACKOWIAK ET AL., HUMAN BRAIN FUNCTION (2d ed. 
2003). 
158 K.J. Friston et al., Nonlinear Responses in fMRI: The Balloon Model, Volterra 
Kernels, and Other Hemodynamic,12 NEUROIMAGE, 466, 469 (2000). “The BOLD signal y t 
= λ v q E is taken to be a static nonlinear function of normalised venous [where] volume (v), 
normalised total deoxyhaemoglobin voxel content (q), and resting net oxygen extraction 
fraction by the capillary bed (E0).” Friston goes on to discuss how certain variables must be 
provided in the function. Id.  
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showing a deficit of activity.159 However, both fMRI-based lie detection 
companies market their products as if an objective determination can be 
made based on the presence of neuronal activity represented by 
increased blood flow.160 
As is apparent from the chain of inferences above, it is unlikely 
that fMRI data directly measures deception. No Lie MRI does not make 
an effort to convey that fMRI technology indirectly measures brain 
activity.161 Cephos does explain that its service is measuring blood flow, 
but nevertheless claims that it is a direct detection of deception.162 As the 
FTC has made clear in previous cases, if there is a representation that 
can be interpreted in both a misleading way and a non-misleading way, 
the advertiser is found to be deceptive.163 As the representations by both 
companies that they can directly detect deception are false, they 
therefore violate FTC regulations. 
B. No Reasonable Basis for Truth Verification Claims 
Both companies make express representations about the accuracy 
of their services and refer to their use of fMRI technology as being able 
to “verify” the truthfulness of statements.164 The use of the word 
 
159 For example, functional neuroimaging could theoretically be used to demonstrate the 
likelihood of a subject having a certain cognitive deficit. See generally Francesca Caramia et 
al., Cognitive deficits in multiple sclerosis: a review of functional MRI studies, 
NEUROLOGICAL SCIENCES (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.springerlink.com/content/ 
h064618280756578/fulltext.html.   
160 See supra Part V. 
161 How an MRI Works, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/products/HowMRIWorks.htm 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2010). Instead of explaining the science behind the technology, No Lie 
MRI simply provides links to third party websites such as Wikipedia.org and 
HowStuffWorks.com. 
162 The Technology Behind Lie Detection, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com 
/lie-detection/index.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2010) (stating that “[f]unctional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) is a type of specialized MRI scan that measures the changes in 
blood flow related to neural activity in the brain or spinal cord,” but then stating “[t]he 
source of lying is in the brain – this is what Cephos measures with our truth verification 
brain imaging service using fMRI technology. We provide independent, scientific validation 
that someone is telling the truth.”). 
163 In re Jay Norris Corp., 91 F.T.C. 751, 836 (1978), aff’d, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 
1979); In re National Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 185 (1976), enforced in part, 
570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).  
164 The header of No Lie MRI’s website advertises “New Truth Verification 
Technology.” See Appendix 3. Likewise, Cephos refers to its services as “lie detection/truth 
verification.” Lie Detection, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/lie-detection/ 
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“verification” is an implicit representation of an accuracy rate of one-
hundred percent. This is particularly true in this context since the 
service offered would be viewed by an ordinary consumer as being 
scientific, and the phrase “verification” is in close proximity to a picture 
of an fMRI scanner and fMRI brain scan images on the website.165 No 
Lie MRI presumably attempts to qualify this statement by claiming that 
their accuracy is over ninety percent effective and that it will soon be 
ninety-nine percent effective.166 However, as discussed earlier, if a claim 
is subject to two interpretations, one of which is misleading, and another 
that is not, the advertisement will still be found to be deceptive as long 
as it is likely to deceive.167 
Furthermore, it is not likely that either company can substantiate a 
claim of ninety percent accuracy. Though researchers have reported the 
ability to detect deception in the laboratory setting with a ninety percent 
accuracy rate, the individuals tested are often small groups of 
undergraduate college students.168 There do not appear to be studies on 
the general population,169 or on individuals whose behavior has been 
associated with morphological changes in brain structure, such as 
recovering alcoholics or drug addicts.170 In fact, it is unclear whether the 
studies’ results can be said to apply to older individuals who have 
normal age-related changes in brain morphology. Without broader 
studies in hand, it appears difficult, if not impossible, for either 
 
index.php#lie (last visited Dec. 4, 2010).  
165 See Appendix 3. 
166 Product Overview, NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com/products/Overview.htm (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
167 In re Rodale Press, Inc., 71 F.T.C. 1184, 1237-38 (1967). 
168 Daniel D. Langleben, Telling Truth From Lie in Individual Subjects With Fast 
Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262, 263 (2005).  
169 See S.K.Z. Ihnen et al., Lack of Generalizability of Sex Differences in the fMRI 
BOLD Activity Associated with Language Processing in Adults, 45 NEUROIMAGE 1020, 
1031 (2009) (“Thus from both a cognitive neuroscience perspective and from the standpoint 
of experimental design, it is important to recognize the possibility that sex differences may 
exist in functional neuroimaging studies of language and other cognitive domains. It is 
equally important, however, to recognize that conclusions about between-group differences 
in fMRI studies should be made conservatively, acknowledging the possibility that 
accounted variability may contaminate the data.”). 
170 Thomas Wobrock et al., Effects of Abstinence on Brain Morphology in Alcoholism, 
259 EUR. ARCHIVES OF PSYCHIATRY AND CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 143 (2009) (“In 
conclusion this study confirms the hypothesis that alcoholism causes brain damages that are 
partially reversible. It should be analyzed in further studies with larger sample sizes, if 
complete brain regeneration is possible maintaining abstinence over a longer period.”). 
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company to substantiate the general non-disclaimed representation that 
they can verify truth. 
An argument can also be proffered that a claim to verify truth 
violates the falsity theory given our current understanding of how the 
brain functions. Current neuroscience research leads to the conclusion 
that a simple verification of truth is impossible given that scientists have 
not found any “deception” neuron whose activity (or lack thereof) 
would be observable by an fMRI scanner. Furthermore, neuroscience 
demonstrates that the brain is remarkably “plastic,” that is, it is capable 
of adaptive structural changes in response to external factors or 
disease,171 as well as the capacity to co-opt other parts of the brain if 
necessary. For example, studies have shown that in blind individuals, 
areas of the visual cortex that are typically believed to deal with sight 
are in fact activated when those individuals read Braille.172 This 
plasticity introduces unpredictability and dynamism in the functional 
roles of the parts of an individual’s brain. 
There is no mention by No Lie MRI or Cephos on their respective 
websites that they take into account this plasticity. Without evidence 
that they have taken these characteristics of human brain function into 
account, the companies’ ability to claim “truth verification” is severely 
undermined. At the very least, both companies should discuss why these 
characteristics of the human brain do not play a role in the “truth 
verification” process. Without such a discussion, both companies would 
likely lose an FTC challenge under the “reasonable basis” test described 
supra.173 That is, the FTC would find the advertising of fMRI lie 
detection to be deceptive, as it did in Firestone, if the companies do not 
provide a reasonable basis for their truth verification claims. 
C. Claim That Professionals Support fMRI as a Lie Detector Are 
Unsubstantiated 
Both companies make express claims that their scans can be used 
 
171 See J.D. Bremmer et al., Structural and Functional Plasticity of the Human Brain in 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 167 PROGRESS IN BRAIN RES. 171 (2007). 
172 N. Sadato et al., Activation of the Primary Visual Cortex by Braille Reading in Blind 
Subjects, 380 NATURE 526, 526 (1996) (functional neuroimaging study demonstrating 
activation of the visual cortex in blind individuals while reading Braille).  
173 See supra Part IV.B.7. 
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in court. Cephos specifically draws on the case of Roper v. Simmons174 
in its “The Technology Behind Lie Detects” section, describing that 
“[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has used fMRIs to help determine when a 
criminal is a juvenile versus an adult.”175 On their “Admissibility” page 
they go on to state that: 
The U.S. Supreme Court has received at least one amicus brief based 
in part on brain scans in Roper v. Simmons to aid in the 
determination of when a person may be tried as an adult. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court and neuroscientists have supported the use of 
fMRI in real-world settings.176 
It is clear that Cephos is making a representation that compares its 
fMRI lie detection technology to the use of fMRI technology in the 
studies submitted in Roper. The amicus brief submitted by the 
American Psychological Association (hereinafter “APA”) did not, 
however, claim that adolescents were having specific brain states based 
on fMRI evidence. Rather, it focused on the morphological changes in 
the adolescent’s brain as the adolescent develops.177 Cephos’ statement 
is misleading as it clearly implies that, since the APA supported the use 
of fMRI evidence as a mitigating factor in Roper, it necessarily supports 
the use of fMRI technology for lie detection. As described above, the 
FTC requires that an advertiser claiming that a scientific consensus 
exists be able to substantiate that claim.178 Thus, the FTC will have a 
strong argument against Cephos if it requests substantiation of the 
claims that a scientific consensus exists on the use of fMRI evidence.179 
The likely failure of either company to substantiate the claims of 
scientific consensus is underscored after taking into account what the 
scientists who conducted the actual studies on fMRI-based lie detection 
have said regarding the application of their findings. Writing in the 
 
174 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
175 The Technology Behind Lie Detection, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/ 
lie-detection/index.php#lie (last visited Nov.26, 2010). 
176 fMRI Testing & Legal Admissibility, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/lie-
detection/index.php#admissibility (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
177 Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent 2-
3, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2003) (No. 03-633).   
178 See supra Part IV.B.7 (discussing F.T.C.’s Substantiation Policy). 
179 Additionally, the logic that Cephos utilizes is inherently flawed. Simply because the 
Supreme Court received an amicus brief from the APA does not therefore mean that the 
Court supports the use of fMRI for lie detection. In fact, the Court did not mention fMRI 
once in its opinion. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
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Journal of Behavioral Neuroscience, Dr. Andrew Kozel stated that his 
fMRI-based study on deception “. . .was designed to identify brain 
regions associated with deceptive answers versus truthful answers, not 
to formally test the method as a means of lie detection. Subsequent 
work will be needed to determine whether this technology can be used 
to distinguish deceptive responses from truthful responses within 
individuals.” 180 Furthermore, Dr. Daniel Langleben,the researcher 
whose patent was purchased by No Lie MRI, has also expressed 
skepticism, distinguishing between “. . . the researchers of deception 
and the merchants of fMRI-based lie detection. While the 
overwhelming majority of the former are recognized scientists, it would 
be interesting to know more about the latter.”181 These statements from 
the very researchers who studied the neural correlates of deception will 
make it difficult for a company such as Cephos or No Lie MRI to 
demonstrate that it has a reasonable basis for representing that a 
scientific consensus exists regarding the application of fMRI-based lie 
detection outside of the academic setting.182 
Because both companies make such direct claims regarding the 
scientific community’s support of fMRI-based lie detection, the claims 
will likely be considered express claims insofar as the Deception 
Statement standard is concerned.183 Furthermore, because the support of 
the scientific community speaks to the purpose or efficacy of the 
services advertised, they will all be presumed to be material. The next 
step is to determine if the claims satisfy the third requirement of the 
Deception Statement, i.e., whether the statements would mislead a 
reasonable consumer. This determination is accomplished by analyzing 
whether the claims made by the companies violate the FTC’s policy as 
described in its statement on advertising substantiation. 
 
180 Frank Andrew Kozel et al., A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of 
Deception, 118 BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004).  
181 D. Langleben & F. Dattillo, Commentary, The Future of Forensic Functional Brain 
Imaging, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 502, 502-03 (2008). 
182 Interestingly, Cephos claims that Dr. Kozel may be available for expert testimony on 
behalf of the subject. The fMRI Testing Process, CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephos 
corp.com/lie-detection/index.php#testing (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
183 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
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D. Claims That fMRI Readings Can be Used in Court Are 
Contradicted by Recent Court Decisions 
The companies’ claim that fMRI findings may be used in court 
proceedings also violates the FTC Act. As mentioned previously, both 
companies assert that their scans can be used as evidence.184 Because 
these claims concern the efficacy of what they are selling, they will be 
deemed material.185 Thus, the remaining question will be whether their 
claims are likely to deceive. The FTC will have a strong argument that 
such claims are deceptive under a reasonable basis theory.186 Under that 
approach, the FTC could argue that both companies do not have a 
reasonable basis upon which to base their claims that fMRI-based lie 
detection is currently admissible in court. 
The FTC could support this argument by showing that fMRI 
findings are unable to pass either of the two tests that are used to 
determine the admissibility of scientific evidence: the Daubert and Frye 
tests. Federal courts, and some state courts, use the Daubert test to 
determine whether scientific evidence should be admissible, whereas 
other states, including California, New York, and New Jersey, use the 
traditional Frye test.187 Recent cases demonstrate that the FTC could 
prevail under either test. 
The Daubert test was formulated by the Supreme Court in Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals to determine whether scientific 
evidence was sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Federal Rules of 
Evidence – most notably Rule 702 which governs testimony by 
experts.188 When evaluating scientific evidence under the Daubert test, a 
judge should consider what have come to be known as the Daubert 
factors, namely: 
1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested and has been 
subject to testing 
2. Whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer 
review and publication 
3. The known or potential error rate of the methods used and 
 
184 See supra Part V.B. 
185 See supra Part V.A. 
186 See supra Part IV.B.7 
187 See Maxine D. Goodman, A Hedgehog on the Witness Stand – What’s the Big Idea?: 
The Challenges of Using Daubert to Assess Social Science and Nonscientific Testimony, 59 
AM. U. L. REV. 635, 683 n. 36 (2010). 
188 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). 
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the existence of standards controlling the operation of the 
technique; and 
4. Whether the method or theory has been generally accepted 
by the scientific community. 189 
In United States v. Semrau, a U.S. Magistrate Judge in Tennessee 
took issue with the last two factors in a case involving fMRI evidence. 
190
 Here, the defendant physician owned corporations that contracted 
with psychiatrists to provide mental health services to patients in 
nursing homes.191 The United States charged Dr. Semrau with engaging 
in a scheme to defraud Medicare, Medicaid, and other benefit programs 
by submitting false and fraudulent claims.192 The Court held a Daubert 
hearing after the government moved to exclude the expert testimony of 
Dr. Steven Laken, President and CEO of Cephos, who intended to 
testify for the defense on the findings of Dr. Semrau’s fMRI study 
conducted by Cephos.193 
With respect to the third Daubert factor — that the operation of the 
technique has a known or potential error rate as well as the existence of 
standards surrounding the technique’s use — the court found fMRI-
based lie detection deficient.194 The court opined that there presently 
exists no “real life” error rate for fMRI-based lie detection outside of 
the laboratory setting.195 On the second part of the third factor, 
concerning the existence and maintenance of standards, the court 
concluded that no such standards exist, notwithstanding the fact that Dr. 
Laken of Cephos testified as to the protocols and standards that he uses 
for his own exams.196 Without any “real life” error rates or any standards 
governing fMRI-based lie detection, the court held that the fMRI 
evidence failed the third Daubert prong.197 The court also found that 
fMRI-based lie detection failed the fourth prong.198 Citing a string of 
expert opinions on the inapplicability of fMRI-based lie detection to 
 
189 Id. at 593-94.  
190 United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074 M1/P (W.D. Tenn. May 31, 2010).  
191 Id. at 3. 
192 Id. at 4. 
193 Id. at 1.  
194 Id. at 32.  
195 Id. at 27. 
196 Semrau, No. 07-10074 M1/P, at 31. 
197 Id. at 32. 
198 Id. 
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real-world lie detection, the court concluded that the technology has not 
garnered general acceptance in the scientific community.199 Accordingly, 
the magistrate recommended exclusion of this testimonial evidence. 
The FTC could also successfully argue that the companies have no 
reasonable basis for a claim of admissibility in jurisdictions that apply 
the Frye test. The Frye test arose from United States v. Frye, a 1923 
decision concerning whether measures of blood pressure could be 
admitted as proof of deception.200 The Frye test stands for the 
proposition that scientific evidence is inadmissible unless the technique 
is “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific 
community.201 
In Wilson v Corestaff Services,202 a New York state court, upon a 
motion in limine, opined that current fMRI data fails Frye’s “general 
acceptance” test.203 In Wilson, the plaintiff sought to introduce fMRI-
based lie detection evidence in order to bolster the credibility of a key 
witness in her case against a staffing agency.204 In addition to the doubts 
that the court expressed about admitting expert testimony to bolster the 
credibility of a fact witness, it nevertheless found that such evidence 
fails the Frye test.205 The court stated that “even a cursory review of the 
scientific literature demonstrates that the plaintiff is unable to establish 
that the use of the fMRI test to determine truthfulness or deceit is 
accepted as reliable in the scientific community.”206 
In light of both Semrau and Wilson, No Lie MRI and Cephos lack 
a reasonable basis for their claims that the fMRI studies they conduct 
are admissible in court. Until fMRI-based lie detection findings are 
admitted, the continued claims of legal admissibility by both companies 
should be considered a deceptive practice under the FTC Act. 
E. Claims of Computer Automation are Deceptive 
As discussed in Part V.C, both companies claim that humans do 
 
199 Id. 
200 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
201 Id. at 1014. 
202 Wilson v Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S. 2d 639, 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
203 Id. at 642. 
204 Id. at 640.  
205 Id. at 641-42.  
206 Id. at 642.  
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not interpret their scans, but are instead analyzed by computers. The 
FTC can challenge these claims under either the falsity theory or the 
substantiation requirement. With respect to a challenge under the falsity 
theory, the FTC could prove that, at some level, a human being must 
program the fMRI’s computer software to interpret a certain BOLD 
threshold of activity as a trigger to a finding of “deception.” This is 
precisely what must be done when creating the hemodynamic models 
that interpret the fMRI data.207 This determination is critical given that 
one threshold level will produce an fMRI image that shows activation 
(i.e. a colored region of the scan) whereas a different threshold may not. 
Under the reasonableness theory, the FTC could also request that the 
companies substantiate their claim that no human determination of what 
constitutes a lie is used. Because of the inherent human interaction in 
setting the BOLD threshold activity, the FTC is likely to prevail under 
either theory. 
VII. THE FTC SHOULD SEEK TO “FENCE-IN” FMRI LIE 
DETECTION COMPANIES 
Since it is likely that various claims of No Lie MRI and Cephos 
violate deceptive trade practice laws, the next question that must be 
answered is how the FTC should seek to remedy the situation. 
Considering the fact that both companies market their services to 
individuals, lawyers, corporations, and the government, the remedy 
provided should be strong enough to prevent the deception of such 
marketing to each of those consumer groups. A serious restriction on 
such marketing is also warranted because the truth of the claims made 
by these companies can not be readily determined by the consumers, a 
fact that the FTC has previously used as a reason to impose serious 
marketing restrictions on violators.208 
Section 5(b) of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to issue cease and 
desist orders that prohibit a continuation of any practices found to be 
deceptive.209 These requirements can go beyond prohibiting the precise 
 
207 See supra Part VI.A (discussing hemodynamic modeling). 
208 See In re Thompson Medical Corp., 102 F.T.C. 648, 834 (1984) (discussing how the 
seriousness of the violation is affected by the consumers’ ability to judge the truth or falsity 
of the claims, which was compounded here by Thompson’s deliberateness in making such 
statements).  
209 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2010). See generally F.T.C. v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 392-
93 (1959). 
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conduct at issue, and can “fence in” the company from engaging in 
similar kinds of deceptive advertising.210 The principal factor for a court 
reviewing a fencing-in order is whether the order bears a “reasonable 
relation to the unlawful practices found to exist.”211 In a recent decision, 
the FTC more specifically noted three factors that it will look at in 
examining a fencing in order, including “(1) the seriousness and 
deliberateness of the violation; (2) the ease with which the violation 
may be transferred to other products; and (3) whether the respondent 
has a history of prior violations.”212 FTC orders are not typically limited 
to any particular product of a company but rather cover a specific 
category or the entirety of products marketed by a company.213 
All three factors here warrant a fencing-in requirement. With 
respect to the first factor, marketing fMRI-based lie detection in its 
infant stage would be considered serious, as the marketing targets a 
wide swath of the population, including individuals, corporations, as 
well as the federal government. Moreover, the marketing by No Lie 
MRI and Cephos continues even in the face of mounting evidence and 
opinion that the technology is not ready for “prime time.” 
Furthermore, the second factor is satisfied. Undoubtedly, both 
companies will attempt to continue marketing their devices as newer 
fMRI machines are created. However, as discussed previously, an 
increase in, for example, the power of the fMRI machine, will not 
necessarily cure many of its fatal flaws. Though neither company 
necessarily has a history of violations at this point, the companies’ 
continued marketing of the products, as well as their media appearances 
promoting their products, clearly tip the scale in terms of a strong 
fencing-in requirement. 
A fencing-in requirement would have to consist of a number of 
provisions. Specifically, it would have to: 
 
210 Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. at 392-93 (“One cannot generalize as to the proper scope of 
these orders. It depends on the facts of each case and a judgment as to the extent to which a 
particular violator should be fenced in…Where the episodes of misbranding have been so 
extensive and so substantial in number as they were here, we think it permissible for the 
Commission to conclude that like and related acts of misbranding should also be enjoined as 
a prophylactic and preventive measure.”). 
211 Jacob Siegel Co. v. F.T.C., 327 U.S. 608, 612-113 (1946). 
212 In re Telebrands, 140 F.T.C. 278, 334 (2005).  
213 See F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394-95 (1965) (“[W]e find no 
defect in the provision of the order which prohibits respondents from engaging in similar 
practices with respect to ‘any product’ they advertise. . . “). 
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1. Prohibit both companies from using the phrase 
“verification” in reference to their fMRI services; 
2. Prohibit any representations that claim an absence of human 
interaction or interpretation in the process of determining 
deception; 
3. Prohibit any representations that the scientific community 
has formed a consensus in favor of using fMRI-based lie 
detection. 
These fencing-in provisions would allow the companies to 
continue to offer the services, but would prevent them from marketing it 
in a way that overstates their efficacy and acceptance in the scientific 
community. 
CONCLUSION 
fMRI research yields extraordinary insight into what is arguably 
the most complex system known to man: the human brain. However, the 
powerful potential of fMRI to uncover our mental states is not without 
concomitant tensions. Constitutional rights prohibiting self-
incrimination and unwarranted search and seizure, issues pertaining to 
privacy, as well as the potential application of fMRI lie detection by the 
government for national security purposes, require us to be vigilant and 
skeptical of the commercialization of fMRI technology. Unfortunately, 
such commercialization is beginning to obtain a critical mass. Both No 
Lie MRI and Cephos currently market to what amounts to the entire 
U.S. population: individuals, corporations, lawyers and the state and 
federal government.214 The development and commercialization of this 
powerful technology has been followed by extraordinary media 
coverage which has fostered a popular notion that fMRI technology can 
“read your mind.”215 Both No Lie MRI and Cephos have leveraged this 
popular notion of fMRI as a mind-reading device. However, the science 
is simply not at the stage where fMRI lie detection should be marketed 
as “truth verification.” 
Marketing fMRI as such is both deceptive and dangerous, and it is 
precisely the role of the FTC to prevent deceptive marketing of fMRI. 
 
214 See CEPHOS CORP., supra note 6; NO LIE MRI, supra note 6. 
215 See, e.g., Brooke Borel, Mind-Reading Tech May Not Be Far Off, POPULAR SCI. 
(June 12, 2009, 4:15 PM), http://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2009-06/mind-reading-
tech-way; 60 Minutes; Reading Your Mind (CBS television broadcast Jan. 4, 2009). 
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There are persuasive arguments as to why fMRI technology has 
powerful potential as a lie detector while others would argue that lie 
detection via fMRI is probably impossible. Because the potential for 
fMRI as a lie detector exists, and because of the immensely positive 
applications that such technology would have, the FTC should not seek 
to eliminate No Lie MRI and Cephos from advertising fMRI-based lie 
detection. Rather, the FTC should recognize that both companies are in 
violation of deceptive trade practices, and should require them to 
advertise the technology within the bounds of the current state of the art. 
VIII. APPENDIX 1216 
The below images are from Daniel Langleben’s study which 
required subjects to lie about the card they were holding.  
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  Langleben, supra note 44. 
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IX. APPENDIX 2217 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X. APPENDIX 3218 
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  FRACKOWIAK, supra note 157, at 601. 
218
  NO LIE MRI, supra note 6.  
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XI. APPENDIX 4 
 
